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THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.*
BY LUDWIG NOIRE.
"The progression of variety from unity," says
Geiger, " seems to be the great fundamental law of
all development of nature and of mind. This law, in
language also, leads us back to a very insignificant
germ, to a primitive sound, which expressed the in-
finitesimall}' limited and exclusive subject-matter that
man then took notice of or beheld with interest, and
out of which the whole wealth of language, nay
—
as I am unhesitatingly convinced—of all languages,
through a series of untold millenniums, has been
slowly unfolded."
The great merit of L. Geiger—who unfortunately
was too early lost to science—is that of having shown
how human reason and language were originally con-
tained in one and the same germ ; that, we cannot say
that reason created language, but that the contrary is
true, that reason was gradually matured and strength-
ened through the instrumentality of the representa-
tive signs of sensory perception ; that, accordingly,
the word was beyond question the element first in
point of time, and that more universal, more correct,
more clear, and more conscious ideas were first at-
tained and formed through words, and after a long
course of development led through words to the pres-
ent state of mature rational thought.
The childish and anthropomorphic view, that God
had said to Adam, "This is a dog, This is an ele-
phant," still held the minds of men captive in the
eighteenth century, with the single difference, that the
philosophers of that day put. human reason in the
place of God, and imagined that men by a kind of
conventional agreement or pact had given names
to things—in short, that they had invented language.
As if an inventive act of this character did not de-
mand aprodigious power of mind—a degree of intellect
and wisdom that must have been infinitely greater than
thatat present possessed by the whole human race !
It is a fundamental error of human thinking, that we
are naturally predisposed to attribute conscious pur-
pose, reflection, and knowledge, which now mainly
guide us in our daily affairs, universally to human
acts, and that we attempt to explain the latter bj' the
• From Die IVelt ,i/s Ent-Mickiliing des Geistes, by Ludwig Noire. Chap.
IX, Part III, Leipzig : Veil ,Si Comp. Translated by /">; >'.
former. Ceres alone foresaw the stupendous results
that were to follow the insignificant beginnings of ag-
riculture. Copernicus did not think of the dangerous
consequences that his new doctrine involved for Chris-
tianity. And the historical Luther,^if he were to
return at the present day to earth,—would break out
in violent anger at the constantly extending emanci-
pation of the human mind that has sprung from his
original reformatory ideas, and at the progress of ra-
tional thought, subversive of all positive creed. The
result of a course of development is frequently as dif-
ferent from its point of origination as the flowering
plant from the seed out of which it has grown.
herder's theory.
The first to rise well above this anthropomorphic
view was Herder, whose divinatory genius in so many
other fields discerned truths that science only later de-
monstrated by the help of accumulations of mate-
rial, and who, even where he erred, never failed to
cast forth the most pregnant suggestions. The fun-
damental idea of his prize-essay Ueber den Ursprung
der Sprache (Upon the Origin of Language), is sub-
stantially this : " Man," says he, "supplies proof of
reflection, when, from out of the hovering dream of
images that flit before his senses he has the power to
collect himself into a moment of wakefulness, to dwell
voluntarily upon some particular image, to survey it
in a brighter and steadier light, and to abstract from
it certain characteristics that establish that this is this
object and no other." This he illustrates by the fol-
lowing example : " A man sees, for instance, a lamb.
It passes, as an image, differently before his vision
than it does before that of other animals. Whenever
man is placed so that he must know a sheep, he
is not disturbed by any instinct (as the wolf or the
lion); the sheep stands there exactly and entirely as
represented by his senses. White, smooth, woolly.
His thoughtfully operating mind seeks for a charac-
teristic. The sheep bleats. The characteristic is
found. The inner sense is at work. The bleating
—
that which produced the strongest impression upon
the mind, that which sprang forth and disengaged it-
self from all other qualities accessible by sight and
touch—that remains with the mind. The sheep, let
us say, returns. White, smooth, woolly. Our man
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looks, touches, meditates, seeks characteristics. The
sheep bleats ; and now he recognizes it. ' Thou art
the Bleating One ! ' he feels inwardly; he has humanly
recognized it, for he has distinctly recognized it ; that
is, recognized it by, and called it by a characteristic.
By a characteristic, a mark! And what else is this
than an inner mark-vford, a verbal cue ? He recog-
nized the sheep by its bleating. This was the compre-
hended token by which the mind clearly hit upon an
idea. What else is this than a word ? And what is
all human language but a collection of such words ? "
This theory Max Miiller has called the Bow-wow
theory, and rejected it.
It cannot be" denied that as an hypothesis of the
origin of language there is a good deal of truth con-
tained in Herder's statement of things. The most
important points to be noted are, that it (i) explains
how a visual image or percept is transformed into the
phonetic word ; and that (2) it makes the creation of
language first appear as attached primarily to single
characteristic marks.
The weak points of this view lie in the facts, (i)
that Herder leaves the origin of the word as depend-
ent upon the necessity of communication, entirely un-
noticed : and it is surely to be assumed that impulse
of feeling and the necessity of communication both
potently influenced the origin of the first word ; and
(2) that the so-called onomatopoetic creation of lan-
guage, that is, the designation of things after the
sounds they make, has not as yet been confirmed by
any extant language. Single words, like cuckoo, and
the like, prove nothing ; and many that appear to us
as imitations can be traced back to other roots that
show no imitational origin whatsoever. All the lan-
guages we know reveal, on the contrary, an inner con-
ceptual connection between words that denote some
crying, sounding object, and primitive roots designat-
ing some human activity. Herder himself, at a later
period, gave up his theory of imitations of sound,
and again adopted that of the revelation of language.
His work on the "Origin of Language," however,
still remains the earliest really philosophical work on
the subject, and may claim the merit of having pointed
out the true road upon which an explanation is to
be sought.
THE INTERJECTIONAL THEORY.
Another attempt at explanation is that which
sought to derive language from interjections, and
which Max Miiller therefore calls the Pooh-pooh the-
ory. This also possesses a certain degree of proba-
bility, for account is taken herein of the necessity of
giving vent to inner emotion by sounds and ejacula-
tions, as also of the endeavor to communicate with
others, and above all, of the example of animals.
whose neighing, barking, roaring, crowing might seem
to represent a prototype—an abortive effort to acquire
phonetic speech. But in the investigation of known
human languages this principle, unfortunately, does
not find any kind of confirmation ; no more so than
does the attempt to regard the separate letters or
sounds of a word as symbolical vehicles of its mean-
ing—as the w in wind and ware, the lva.fluo, light,
love, and so forth. Serious philological science re-
gards all these attempts as failures, and at best as
ingenious diversions.
MAX MiJLLER'S THEORY.
The theory propounded by Max Miiller* himself,
which has been jocosely called the Ding-dong theorj',
is even less tenable. This distinguished scholar
thinks, that to every being was granted a peculiar
typical sound, that in man originally there existed a
most copious phonetic world— a real spring-time of
speech—that tunefully responded to the impressions of
the outside world. This is aiirneJ>etitio Jiriiicipii, and
explains really nothing. For we are still compelled to
ask how and when this world of sound passed into
man, and how man came to apply it to things ; and
we should be obliged constantly to fall back to the
stage at which the first sound burst forth. And then
we should be no farther ahead than before.
Still it is quite easy to understand why so eminent
a scholar as Max Miiller should have hit upon this sin-
gular idea. He was probablj' led astray by his obser-
vation of children, to whom we usually turn when in
search of information concerning anything primitively'
human. Now, it is true, daily experience teaches that
there exists in children an impulse to speech, an inci-
tation to language, and that they early strive to call
objects by the names they have heard. And it has
frequently been my experience that highly intelligent
men, to whom I had propounded Geiger's theory of
the priority of words to concepts, at once resorted to
the following counter-argument : " But look at chil-
dren. No sooner do they perceive things than they
designate them by words of their own creation, which
bear scarcely any similarity to those which have been
taught them. What is that but an awakening of the
instinct of speech?" This, it must be admitted, is
true. But the genuine science of to-day is no longer
satisfied with reasoning of this kind. It demands an
explanation of the word ; it demands an account of
the origin of the affair.
The speech-instinct of the child is the repetition
of that long line of development which we must as-
sume proceeded from the origin of language up to the
present day. So long as the child does not feel this
instinct, so long as it merely contemplates, touches,
* We shall also publish, at the close of this series of translations, some
extracts from Max Miiller's works in criticism of Noir6.
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cries, asks for food, and so on, up to that time it rep-
resents the period of speechless humanity,—the time
at which human nature had not as yet separated from
animal nature. And the fact, too, that the child even
during this period, before it begins to form concepts,
actuallj' evinces an interest in objects, grasps at them,
and throws them awa}^, this fact might seem to sug-
gest that even speechless humanity handled certain
working-tools of its own. But the language-instinct
is a thing ingrafted in the child during a long succes-
sion of generations. Our scientific curiosity, how-
ever, asks for information concerning a time shrouded
in the deepest darkness, when the -''word was made
flesh, and dwelt among us," when instinctive life first
began to pass into the clear consciousness of speaking
humanity.
geiger's researches.
To Geiger the further honor is due of having shown
that the oldest root-words, at least as far as they can
be traced back, express a human act, a human gesture,
and he justly observes that this must probably have
been that which was the most iuieresiitig to man, that
of which he first had knowledge, which most strongly
riveted his attention, and syinpathetically reechoed in his
breast. The last-mentioned fact is to be particularly
noted. In our intercourse with our fellow-beings our
countenance gradually assumes an expression like that
of the human counterpart before us; tears and laugh-
ter are contagious; when we see a person in imminent
danger of life, we ourselves anxiously go through the
very movements which the person would have to make
to escape from the danger he is in : the imitation of
human action is so natural to us that we immediately
feel and reproduce the cheerful expression of joy, the
convulsion and depression of pain, as well as scorn
and menace. In view of this Geiger believes that the
first cry of language must have been an aping reflex
of the face of another accompanied—from the fact that
it was the result of emotion—by sound. (Here, of
course, we would have had visual percept and speech-
sound in one.) And he held that a sound of this
kind, periodical!}' repeated, must have recalled to mind
a definite perception, sensation, or visual image, and
that thus the first word, of whose contents, of course,
we can have no idea, might have originated.
Be this as it may, it remains indisputable that
everywhere in the designations of things we meet with
human action as that which first made the object in
question interesting. This human activity, is, of course,
as yet entirely identical with animal activity. The
Greek dipoo, to flay, counts among its descendants
dipixa, skin, dopv, wood, Spij?, tree, and the English
tree. Skin is that which is pulled off; wood that which
is stripped of bark ; and so tree. This same law, with
wonderful consistency, appears also in a number of
words that, judging them by their meaning at the
present day, scarcely seem to present any connection
whatsoever. Night, through the notion dark, black,
is carried back to the Sanskrit root ang, Latin ungo,
to dye, to smear; ground asiA. terra to a root denoting
to grind, to crumble ; corn denotes something that has
been husked ; thunder (a word that certainly sounds
onomatopoetic) must be referred, according to Max
Miiller, to the Sanskrit root tan, to stretch, and is akin
to tone or the sound peculiar to a stretched cord. In
the same manner iener, tender, must be derived from
thin, and the latter again from the fact of tension.
Schreiben, ypaq)oo, and scribere, as well as the English
write and the German Riss, are identical with a root
denoting ritzen, to scratch. From the root da, to bind,
are derived words of the following meanings : yoke,
gird, husband, twins, sister, house, and innumerable
others. Tools, language designates bywords that cor-
respond to the human acts which they promote; they
are symbolized, so to speak, actively. Scissors, hatchets,
and saws are things that shear (Swedish skdra, sickel),
hack, and saw. Everywhere, in all the formations of
words with which we are familiar, the conceptual
element is seen to prevail, but nowhere do we find
direct imitation of the sounds of nature. The names
of the majority of animals and plants designate the
creatures and things to which they refer, by color
;
and almost in all languages we recognize as the most
primitive roots, human and animal acts symbolized in
the form of some characteristic gesture or posture;
and even in historical times we find, that the develop-
ment and growth of language follow exactly the same
course. The abstract yf^//;*' is traceable to a word that
denotes to knead a soft clay. The beautiful German
word Dichter (poet) suggests the primitive untutored
bard, who was originally wont to dictate to a scribe the
words of his own invention. And, moreover, if the
imitation of the sounds of nature had originally been
the principle according to which words were formed,
it certainly would have occupied an extensive place in
languages, and would have long remained perceptible
and continued perhaps up to the present day in active
operation.
It is unmistakable that we have approached through
this explanation considerably nearer to the dark depths
from which the fountain of speech first bubbled forth.
The question further,
—
previously touched upon,—as
to whether man first possessed tools or speech, Geiger
decides in favor of the latter; and he bases his proof
upon the fact, that the names of tools and of the re-
sults they bring about, are expressed by roots that de-
note human physical acts ; hence, that all words de-
noting grinding (niahlen), milling, and the like, were
originally connected with ^nal, mar {jnordeo), which
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meant to bruise, to crush with the fingers, and probably
also to crush with the teeth. Sculpo to cut out with a
chisel, is a collateral form of scalpo, which originally
meant to scratch with the nails. The root vc, the basis
of our weave, is traced back by Geiger, with a reference
to vivien, withe (willow), to the oldest practiced art
;
namely, the twisting of branches into lodge-nests for
primitive man, which afterwards led to weaving or
plaiting, an art possessed by all savage tribes.
But I must confess that to my mind this last
argument possesses very little weight. Man, it is true,
did not have complicated, or even perfect, tools before
the possession of speech,
—
perhaps not even mill-
stones ; but I am inclined to doubt, whether, notwith-
standing this fact, he might not have designated
crushing with stones and teeth interchangeably by the
same root, as well as all scraping with the hands and a
stone, which latter in this case would merely be a part
of the hand.
There is also something far-fetched about Geiger's
hypothesis respecting the origin of the first word.
His sympathetic aping reflection of a gesture with
accompanying speech-sound, I must admit, seems a
rather bold abstraction, in which Geiger manifestly
wished to comprise the three factors met with in the
oldest roots : which are (i) the phonetic word, (2) the
visual percept, and (3) human posture or gesture as
the expression of an act.
noire's conception.
Now I take it that man, who like the ape and
other animals is a social being, very early acquired a
power of communication, that is, a language of gesture
or attitude. Nothing stands in the way of such an as-
sumption, since we find this faculty very distinctly
marked and extensively represented throughout the
entire animal kingdom. Animals are trained to the
expression of significant gestures, as birds are to song,
which is at the same time the expression of an inner
emotion and a kind of communication, being intended
either to allure the female, or to entertain the brood-
ing bird. It is therefore not at all impossible, that in
the case of primeval men, living gregariously, gestures
might have been developed with a definite conceptual
content, established as such, and transmitted by course
of training to after generations. We must, of course,
conceive these gestures as a summons to some ap-
pointed act or task, as we find to be actually the case
with ants, termites, bees, etc. It would suffice now
for some vehement animated gesticulatory action of
this kind to be accompanied in every instance by a
peculiar sound (let us call to mind, for example, the
many different sounds by which a dog accompanies his
signs of joy, grief, submission, repentance, and im-
patience)—and in consequence thereof this gesture
could very well be recalled to mind by the sound ;
while, following the law of development, the former
would gradually recede, and the latter ultimately attain
absolute supremacy. As stated this is \\\^\y possible,
and it increases in probability when we take note of
the fact that savage nations, ignorant persons, and
people who do not perfectly understand a language,
are always wont to emphasize their words by lively
gesticulation.
A possible origin of this kind ought to satisfy com-
pletely our inquisitiveness ; agreeably to what Dugald
Stewart, also quoted by M. Miiller, justly maintains :
"In examining the history of mankind, as well as in
"examining the phenomena of the material world,
"when we cannot trace the process by which an event
^' has been produced, it is often of importance to be
"able to show how it may have been produced by
"natural causes. Thus, although it is impossible to
"determine with certainty what the steps were by
"which any particular language was formed, yet if
"we can show, from the known principles of human
"nature, how all its various parts might gradually
" have arisen, the mind is not only to a certain degree
"satisfied, but a check is given to that indolent phi-
" losophy which refers to a miracle whatever appear-
" ances, both in the natural and moral worlds, it is un-
" able to explain."
Any one who will survey the successive develop-
ment of things as they start from the simplest ele-
ments, and through continued combinations effected
by the influence of the external world, early deviate
so much from their origin that the latter is scarcely
longer recognizable, will surely admit that the most
cutting sneer to be levelled at speculative philosophy,
in its confidence of victory, would be to demand it
to construct a camel a prio)-i. But empiric historical
science has also cause to be modest, notwithstanding
that it follows the much surer road, constantly con-
trolled by present events, of inference from that which
now exists to what before existed ; in which process
it employs as basis the solid foundation of innumerable
facts, upon which it constructs ever narrowing stages
reaching up to an apex of unity, while the speculative
method endeavors to rest its complete structure upon
that apex.
I shall try to show by an example, how abundantly
also inductive science has cause to be satisfied with
the possibility of explanation. I shall suppose that
after the lapse of a few thousand years literary tradi-
tion had suffered an interruption, and that the world
was entirely left in the dark concerning the scientific
researches of our present epoch. Electricity will, by
that time, have become of enormous importance, and
found a wide application in all the relations of life.
Let us suppose now that some historian starts the
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question (as the case is in our own time with the
question of fire) of how and in what manner hu-
manity at first obtained possession and knowledge of
this wonderful natural agency. Does anybody really
fancy that the historian by continuous and successive
inferences would ultimately light upon the fact that
once upon a time a certain physicist had hung up frogs-
legs by iron hooks upon copper railings 1 Certainly
not. But a thousand possibilities will occur to him,
and with these he will rest satisfied.
I shall now, in addition to those above set forth,
submit another hypothesis, which also conforms to ex-
perience as deduced from animal life, and the pos-
sibility of which will hardly be contested by any one.
If we examine the phonetic utterances of the ani-
mal world, we shall find underlying the same a variety
of inner impulses, but always the endeavor to make
these impulses intelligible to others. We find, princip-
ally, three kinds of sounds; viz.
—
1. Calls of Allurement or Summons. These are
an expression of emotion, accompanied by an obscure
percept, and they aim at influencing the will and acts of
a kindred being.
2. War-Cries. Also the expression of emotion.
They endeavor to arouse fear and dismay in an enemy.
3. Calls of JVarning. Only among social ani-
mals. Emotion cooperates. The percept prevails.
Endeavor to work upon the will of others by arousing
a similar percept.
It is not difficult to discern in these three catego-
ries the sub-soil of human speech. All three have
this in common with one another, that they spring
from the inner world of emotion, and strive in turn to
awaken emotion—the first and third a kindred, and
the second an opposite emotion. In the first there is
present also either an obscure percept, as, for instance,
that of a female, or a still clearer one, as when the
hen calls her brood to newly-discovered food. So
too, in the third, is the percept of impending danger,
which by the cry is also excited in distant or dispersed
companions.
The first human sound that deserved the name of
word, could not have differed from these animal sounds
except by a higher degree of luminousness in the per-
cepts or images which accompanied it and were
awakened by it. Discipline must have helped to
bring it about that such a sound
—
just as the notes of
a bird—upon being often repeated, became a kind of
representative sign, which along with the sensation
also excited the faint image. Such sounds are inter-
jections. But interjections are not adapted to the
formation of language, because the emotional element
still prevails in them to such an extent that clear and
tranquil percepts cannot form, and, therefore, cannot
originate from the same. On the other hand, we are
able to imagine many possible ways in which a sound
as yet involved in the animal stage of development
could become the representative of a definite, inde-
pendent percept.
Should any one interpose, that for such a huge edi-
fice my hypothesis assumes a much too narrow basis,
let him call to mind the example I cited above, in
which, from the twitching of a frog's leg through con-
tinuous combinations and mental efforts the myste-
rious, hardly dreamed of domain of electricity was
drawn within the reach of human knowledge and
power. What we call chance has demonstrably played
a principal role at the beginning of the most impor-
tant and difficult advances of human civilization.
Such is the case with the acquisition of the agency of
fire, which, like tools, language, and religion, consti-
tutes a truly distinctive characteristic of man ; how
variously may we not imagine its origin to have been,
and how many accidents may not have borne an ac-
tive share in that origin ! At all events, the task re-
quired human energy, and, as Geiger says, we have
reason to admire the boldness that accomplished that
feat, never before achieved, when man, for the first
time, approached the dreaded flame and carried aloft
over the earth the burning log of wood—an inspired
act without precedent in the animal world, and of im-
measurable consequence to the development of hu-
man civilization. And if we compare the oldest form
of implement for the production of fire by friction
—
as it is still found among savage tribes, and even
among civilized nations in certain religious practices
—which was a simple piece of wood bored into a
softer piece and set on fire by continuous twirling,
when we compare such an implement with the holes
that are found bored in the same way in stone-axes,
we are readily led to assume that accident was the ori-
gin of this acquisition, and that from this single thing
and its further retention and application all the rest
resulted.
THE LOGIC OF VERIFICATION.
BY JOHN DEWEY.
In a recent article in The Open Court having the
title "Is Logic a Dualistic Science?" I attempted
to show as against Mr. Venn's recent work that logical
processes do not deal with the comparison of ideas,
on the one hand, with perceptions on the other ; the
reason, in general, being that logical processes enter
into the structure of perceptions as well as of ideas,
and that, therefore, such processes could not be con-
sidered as beginning with the comparison of ready-
made perceptions and conceptions. The opinion was
then advanced that there is but one world of knowl-
edge, whether in the form of perceptions or of ideas,
and that this world is logical all the way through.
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To this doctrine an objection somewhat after this
fashion might be raised : Such a conception makes the
process of verification impossible. If there is but one
realm of knowledge, what is the standard of truth ?
with what shall we compare our ideas in order to verify
them ? If logic has a dualistic basis, the question is
easily answered; on one hand, there is the world of
conceptions of ideas, on the other, the world of percep-
tions, of facts. And we test our ideas by comparing
them with facts. But upon the theory of a single realm
of knowledge, logical throughout, no such comparison
and testing is possible. It seems upon this theory that
the only criterion of truth is the consistency of ideas
with themselves, and every one knows that ideas may
be self-consistent, and yet untrue, or even highly
absurd.
Undoubtedly the objection points to a serious diffi-
culty, one which must be reckoned with. I shall not
attempt to evade it by denying that there is a relative
distinction at least, between idea and fact. I shall
rather ask what does this distinction of idea and fact
(speaking always from the logical point of view) mean
and how does it arise? If an objection lies against the
unitary theory advanced, a still stronger objection lies
against the dualistic theory. This objection I may
state as follows : What is this world of facts by com-
parison with which we test our ideas? Is it the real,
the true world ? This supposes that this real world,
the actual facts, are known. But if they are known,
so that they can afford the standard of verification,
why do we go to the trouble of forming a theorj', of
making a hypothesis? If we already know the facts,
it certainly seems a waste of energy and of time to
frame guesses, to elaborate ideas simply for the sake
of going through the meaningless process of seeing
whether or not they agree with a truth already per-
fectly known. It is evident that we only form a theory,
or entertain ideas, as distinguished from facts, when
we are not in possession of the truth, when we are in
search of it. Per xontra, if the facts by which we are
to test our theory are not the real facts but the facts
as they seem to be, the facts as previously known,
there is another difficulty. It is just because we sus-
pected these apparent facts of not being real, that we
framed a theory which should get nearer to the reality
of the case. It would certainly be a curious operation
to test our theory by a standard whose discrediting
had led to the formation of the theory. This then
is the dilemma with which I would confront the dua-
listic notion. If the standard by which we are to test
our ideas is the real fact, the actual truth, then, by
the necessity of the case, the standard is unknown ;
if the standard is facts as they seem to be, as already
apprehended, it is worthless. The only standard of
value is out of reach; the attainable standard is no
standard at all. In either case, verification would
seem to be an impossible process.
I hope this result may at least induce us to con-
sider the other point of view ; the notion that we do
not have ideas separate from facts, which we proceed
to compare one with the other, but that the (un-
doubted) distinction between idea and fact is itself
logical, brought about by and within logical processes.
Let me begin with a well-known psychological fact
—that which Bain calls "primitive credulity." So
far as we can judge, early childhood makes no differ-
ence between ideas and facts. It does not recognize
its ideas as ideas, but it at once projects them into the
outer realm. Suggest an idea to a baby, by saying
some word which he recognizes, the name of a known
object or person, and the baby looks around him to
see that object. A child's mind is like an animal's ;
it is intensely practical. Ideas, as such, do not ap-
peal to it. The thing, the action, is what the child is
after. A baby's inability to entertain a question, or
even after it can answer questions relating directly to
fact, its inability to consider questions involving a
' whether this or that,' testify to its incapacity to hold
an idea in its ideal aspect. What is it that breaks up
this primitive intellectual innocency ; this immediate
transformation of idea into fact ? Apparently, it is the
disappointment of expectation, at first, and then as a
further development of this, the dim perception of
contradictions. The baby, when he hears the word
' Papa,' looks about him and does not see his father ;
probably, at first, the new idea, what he actually sees,
simply expels the other idea. The idea of father is
not retained before the mind long enough for the con-
tradiction to be perceived. But there is at least the
shock of unrealized expectation, and the feeling of the
necessary adjustment to the new idea. As the mind's
power of holding its ideas fixed becomes greater-, the
new idea will not simply drive out the other, substi-
tuting itself for it, but will struggle with it for pos-
session of the mind. Now the actual idea contradicts
the idea which the mind is endeavoring to project
into actuality ; it prevents this projection. It is, as it
seems to me, this two-fold process : on one hand, the
retaining of an idea before the mind, on the other, its
repulsion from actual fact through a stronger contra-
dictory idea, which leads the mind to the hitherto un-
entertained recognition of an idea as only ideal, as a
mere idea.
This analysis seems to me to be verified by the
phenomena of illiterate and savage life, of dreams,
and of hypnotism, so far as we can appeal to that un-
settled sphere. The difficulty savages have of dis-
criminating ideas from facts is a commonplace of
ethnology. The absence of contradictory facts re-
tained in the mind leads us to take everything we
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dream as real, while we dream it. The savage con-
tinues to think of it as real when he awakes ; it is
only something that happened in another region of
experience, when the soul sallied forth from the body.
And while I would not speak dogmatically regarding
hypnotism, Janet and others seem to have made it
probable that its essential phenomenon is dissociation,
the severing of the connections between groups of
ideas united in ordinary sense-perception and thought.
These connections being broken down, the mind ex-
periences no contradiction on being told while in a
room of a house that it is in a boat upon the ocean.
The idea, having no other body of ideas over against
which it is set, is taken, as in childhood, for a fact.
But to return to the argument. The mind learns
through the contradictions existing between its ideas
that not all can be projected as facts ; some must be
dismissed as false, or, at least, retained only tentatively
as possible facts. It is this tentative holding of an
idea which constitutes the logical distinction of idea
and fact. The fact is the idea which nothing contra-
dicts, which harmonizes with other ideas, which al-
lows the mind free play and economical movement.
The idea is at first the fact about which difficulties are
felt, which opposes a barrier to the mind's movement,
and which, if not in opposition to other facts, is, at
least, in opposition to apparent facts. In a word, the
distinction between 'idea' and 'fact ' arises along with
the distinction between real and apparent fact.
Let us test this result by considering scientific hy-
pothesis. The mind frames a hypothesis or theory,
because it is dissatisfied with its present (or rather
former) judgments. The ideas which it has formerly
taken to be facts, it has come to look upon with sus-
picion. The hypothesis is an idea Avhich is supposed
to be fact, or at least, to be nearer fact than previous
ideas. But, till it can be verified, it is held only ten-
tatively, and this holding may be of all degrees of
comparative assurance, from a mere suggestion or
question to a well-defined theory. The process of
transforming the hypothesis, or idea entertained ten-
tatively, into a fact, or idea held definitely, is verifi-
cation. We saw at the outset the difficulties which
beset the ordinary crude notion of verification, that
which considers it as a process of comparing ready-
made ideas with ready-made facts ; let us see how our
present notion meets these difficulties.
In the first place, what are the facts in contrast
with which the hypothesis is regarded as merely an
idea ? They are not a fixed something ; fixed either
in amount, or in quality. If the idea, the hypothesis
needs extension, transformation and verification, the
'facts' in their turn, are in need of enlargement, al-
teration and significance. Take, for example, the
hypothesis of evolution. The facts by which this
theory is to be verified or disproved are not a fixed,
unchangeable body ; if the theory gets its verification
through the facts, the facts get a transformed and en-
larged meaning through the theory. I do not mean
simply that the theory leads to the discovery of new
facts, though this is noteworthy, and, I think, inex-
plicable on the dualistic assumption. But suppose
there is some animal of which absolutely no new ob-
servation has been made since the formation of the
theory of evolution ; our knowledge of that animal,
t\ie. facts oi the animal have been, none the less, trans-
formed, even revolutionized, l^et this instance illus-
trate the relation of the facts to the idea ; if the idea,
the theory, is tentative, if it is pliable and must be
bent to fit the facts, it should not be forgotten that the
'facts' are not rigid, but are elastic to the touch of
the theory.
In other words, the distinction between the idea
and the facts is not between a mere mental state, on
one side, and a hard and rigid body on the other.
Both idea and 'facts' are flexible, and verification is
the process of mutual adjustment, of organic interac-
tion. It is just because the 'facts' are not final, set-
tled facts that the mind frames its hypothesis or idea;
the idea is the tentative transformation of these seem-
ing facts into more real facts.
More in detail, we may consider the process as fol-
lows : The mind attacks the mass of facts which it
suspects not to be facts piece-meal. It picks out some
one aspect or relation of these 'facts,' isolates it,
(technically the process of abstraction) and of this
isolated relation it forms a h}'pothesis, which it then
sets over against the facts from which this relation has
been isolated. The isolated relation constitutes, tech-
nically, the universal ; the background of mass of facts
is the particular. The verification is the bringing to-
gether of this universal and particular : if the univer-
sal confronted with the particulars succeeds in filling
out its own abstract or empty character by absorbing
the particulars into itself as its own details, it is verified.
And there is no other test of a theory than this, its
ability to work, to organize 'facts' into itself as speci-
fications of its own nature. But on the other side, the
particulars attacked by the universal do not remain
indifferent ; through it they are placed in a new light,
and as facts gain a new quality. Organized into the
theory, they become more significant ; what had pre-
viously been oppositions and even contradictions among
them is removed, and we get a harmonious system.
The important point then is to see that verification is
a two-edged sword. It does not test and transform
the 'idea,' the theory, any more than it tries and
moulds the 'facts.' In other words, if the idea is ten-
tative, needing to be brought before the court of the
facts, so also the 'facts' are inadequate and more or
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less contradictory—that is, they are only apparently
facts. They need therefore to be harmonized and ren-
dered significant through the idea, the hypothesis.
We may indifferently describe the process as a move-
ment of the theory upon the facts whereby the latter
are rendered more rational, i. e. , more significant and
harmonious, or as a confronting of the theory by the
facts, whereby it is verified. The actual result is the
same in either case; we simply describe it from two
points of view.
To recapitulate the whole matter : the distinction
between idea and fact fs a relative one, not an absolute
separation; it is made for the sake of what we may
term either a more real and more complete fact, or a
more adequate and certain idea. There is a period,
not only in childhood, but in every science, and as to
every subject-matter in every science, when idea and
fact are at one. But contradictions arise ; the mind
therefore holds idea and fact apart, regarding the
idea as tentative and the fact as apparent. To this
stage, there supervenes a period in which the mind
attempts to get a definitive idea—or, from the other
side, a real fact. It therefore by observation, experi-
ment, and all other means at its disposal, makes its
idea as definite and coherent as possible, and thus
frames a hypothesis or theory. This theory it brings
to the apparent facts, in order to organize them, to
give them new and additional significance. So far as
this is accomplished, idea and fact again become one,
to remain one until further contradictions are discov-
ered when the process must again be gone through
with. And this is the description of the actual pro-
cess of knowledge, of science. We have first an un-
conscious identification of idea and fact, and on this
basis the universe, the realm of experience, is built up.
But this universe lays itself open somewhere to sus-
picion ; this suspected aspect is held apart from the
rest, as an idea, the remainder being left undisturbed
as 'fact.' The idea is wrought over as an idea into a
scientific hypothesis, and is then projected again into
the facts. As verified it becomes an essential part of
the facts, changing to some degree or other the char-
acter of these facts. But this new universe again be-
iiaves suspiciously: the suspicious 'fact' is again ar-
rested and condemned as a tnere idea, but passing
through the reformatory of thought issues as an hy-
pothesis, and is turned out again into the free world of
fact.
This continued process of breaking up and re-
combination by which knowledge detects, condemns,
and transforms itself is verification. Thus the analy-
sis of this process confirms the former contention that
the logical sphere is integral and unitary.
Ann Arbor.
THE NERVOUS SYSTEM OF THE VERTEBRATES.
Professor Ernst H^ckel* in explaining the evolu-
tion of Vertebrates calls our attention to the import-
ance of Amphioxus lanceolatus, a little fish about
two inches long, shaped like a lancet, and living,
mostly hidden in the sand, in shallow places of the
Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the North Sea. It has
no head, no cranium, no brain. The front part is dis-
tinguishable from the hind part almost solely by the
presence of the mouth surrounded by a number of
cilia ; and yet the Lanceolate belongs to the aristocratic
class of Vertebrates : it possesses a spinal cord. The
Lanceolate, accordingly, is the last surviving represen-
tative of the lowliest family among the Vertebrates.
Pallas, the first discovefer of the Lanceolate, did
not at once recognize the importance of his find. He
considered it as a kind of imperfect snail. Yet the pre-
sence of a chorda dorsalis, i. e. of a cartilaginous string
forming the axis of the skeleton, and the medulla spinalis
(spinal cord), fix the relation of this little fish beyond
all doubt. Kowalewsky and Kupffer, moreover, have
proved, that to a certain degree the ontogeny of the
Lanceolate corresponds in all particulars on the one
hand with that of the lower Vertebrates and on the
other with that of the Ascidians. Thus we can con-
sider it as an established truth that the Lanceolate is
the connecting link between the Invertebrates and the
Vertebrates.
Leuckart and Pagenstecher discovered in the front
part of the spinal cord of the Amphioxus (see MiJller's
Archiv, 1858, p. 561) a small vesicle, which represents
a primitive brain—if brain it can be called. However,
whether this vesicle represents the initial state of
all three bulbs that appear in a higher development
(as W. Miiller says), or whether it represents the
third bulb only (as Mihalkovics says), or whether it
corresponds (as Huxley says) to the thalamencephalon,
i. e. , the second bulb, is still an unsettled question.
It is not improbable that the Amphioxus which we are
acquainted with, is a degenerated form of that creature
from which the higher vertebrates have descended.
In the plates published in the last number (No. 138,
page 2215) of The Open Court Professor Haeckel com-
pares the development of a mollusk, like the Ascidian
(A), with Amphioxus lanceolatus (B). How small are the
differences in the beginning ! Andyet they were destined
to keep the one creature in its humble condition of a
mere vegetative existence, while the other in the course
* NatUrliche Sckop/ungsgesckichte^ Chap. 24.
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of further evolution was enabled to gain dominion
over the whole creation of earth.
There are several differences of radical importance
between Amphioxus lanccolatus and the higher Ver-
tebrates
;
yet besides that of the absence of brain
and cranium in the former, there is no greater disparity
than in the arterial system of blood-circulation. The
Acrania (the Vertebrates without cranium, represented
by the Lanceolate) have no proper hearts ; their hearts
are mere arterial tubes, while the Craniata (the Ver-
tebrates with a cranium) are throughout endowed with
a regular heart, which, engine-like, drives the arterial
blood through the whole system.
The nervous systems of all the Vertebrates are
greatly different from those of the Invertebrates. There
is no oesophagean ring encircling the gullet ; and in-
stead of isolated ganglia, we have one continuous
column which is no longer below but far above the in-
testinal canal. This column is protected by bony
covers (the vertebrae) which constitute a flexible yet
strong backbone. The foremost ganglia together with
their vertebral cases are transformed into brain and
cranium ; but the hemispheres and their bony cover,
NERVOUS SYSTEM OF FROG, VEN (After Ecker.)
H. Hemispheres.
Lop. Optic Lobes.
M. Medulla.
Ml.-Mio. Spinal
nerves.
5. Sympathetic
nerve.
Sr.-Sio. Ganglia of
the Sympathetic.
MS. Branches c n-
necting spina! cord
and sympathetic.
No. Femoral nerve.
Ni. Sciatic nerve.
I-X. Cranial nerves.
/. Olfactory.
//. Optic nerve with.
{0} eye.
///. Oculo-motor.
IV. Trochlear.
V. Trigeminal.
VI. Abducent.
VII. and F. Facial.
VIII. Auditory.
IX. Glossopharyn-
geal.
X. Vagus.
V^. Gasserian Gang-
lion (of fifth nerve).
V}. Connect ion £
Gasserian ganglion
with the S y m p a-
thetic.
F. Facial nerve.
G. Ganglion of the
Vagus.
X1-X4. Branches of
the Vagus.
the top of the head, are an additional growth, which
has developed out of the first vertebra.*
As the most representative examples of the various
Vertebrates we select a number of diagrams of the
brains of fishes, amphibians, birds, and mammals.
Squale -Renaid.
Broc^ei
BRAIN OF A PIKE AND OF A SHARK, (.^fter Leuret and Gratiolet.)
tc. Cerebral tubercles (lobes I.
to. Optic tubercles (lobes).
te. Ethmoid or olfactory tubercle.
tv. Vagus tubercle. The ganglion of the vagus nerve.
i'. Cerebellum.
e. Olfactory nerves.
0. Optic nerves.
p. Pathetic nerve.
w. Oculo-mctor nerve.
a. Abducent nerve.
/. Trifacial nerve.
f. Facial nerve.
/. Labyrinthic nerve.
V. Vagus or branchial nerve.
The most prominent divisions of the nervous sys-
tem in the Vertebrates, i. e. , in Fishes, Reptiles, Birds,
and Mammals, are :
1. The Spinal Cord;
2. The Bulb {Medulla Oblongata);
3. The Small Brain (^Cerebellum);
4. The Bridge (^pons Varolii);
5. The Optic Lobes ; and
6. The Thalami Optici.
(The Optic Lobes are of greater importance in the
lower Vertebrates ; they are called in the physiology
of man the Four Hills {corpora quadrigemina). The
Thalamus remains entirely undeveloped in the lower
vertebrates.)
7. The Striped Body {Corpus Siriatum).
8. The Hemispheres, or brain proper {Cerebrum).
Gegenbauer, Untersuchungen zur VergUichenden Anatomie der UTir-
beUhiere. Part. Ill, das KopfskeUtt der Selachier als Grundlagl zur Beurthti-
liing der Gertese des Kop/skeletts der WirheUhiere. Leipzig: 1872.
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BOA CONSTRICTOR. (After Sw eproduced from Bastian.) Perroquet.
.
Cerebral lobes.
. Optic lobes.
.
Cerebellum.
, Membrane of the nose,
Olfactory ni
Optic nerve
Third
BRAIN OF A PERCH. (Gcgenbauer, after Cuvii
A. Cranial lobe with olfactory ganglion (/).
B. Optic lobe.
C. Cerebellum.
D. Medulla oblongata.
/. Olfactory nerve.
a. Nasal sac.
//. Optic nerve, severed.
///. Oculo-motor nerve.
IK Trochlear nerve.
V. Trigeminal.
y/i. Auditory.
V///. Vagus with its ganglion ^.
ki. Branches of vagus.
;«. Dorsal branch of trigeminus in connectic
n. Dorsal branch of vagus.
afty. The three branches of the trigeminus K
6e. Facial nerve.
Jl. Branches of the vagus.
Corte Cliouette
.
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The nervous system originates as a hollow tube
formed by a very thin film. At an early stage of its
development, the upper end (as seen in the adjoined
figure) bulges out into three continuous bulbs. The
first is to be the fore brain, the second the mid brain,
and the third the hind brain.
EARLY STAGE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM IN THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE
EMBRYO. (From Wiedersheira.)
CORONAL SECTIONS.
I
(BD.) Blastoderm.
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BY CONSTANCE C. W. NADEN.
We went a-begging for a nobler creed,
We craved the living bread and wine of thought,
That Eucharist which is not sold or bought
But freely given ; yet, did any heed
'Twas but to offer pence, or bid us feed
From empty sacramental vessels, wrought
Of gold or brass ; we spent our prayers for nought.
Faint and athirst with spiritual need.
Then some brought grapes, and some brought corn and yeast
Plenteous and good
;
yet still we murmured " Give !
This is scant fare when thirst and hunger cry
;
Teach us to change our garner for a feast,
Preparing food by which the mind may live,
Perennial loaves and flagons never dry."
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE BASIS OF DR. LEWINS'S PHILOSOPHY.
•'Omnia vtea, vtecu}n porta.''—Bias.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
I SHOULD be glad, with your permission, to make a very brief
minute on the fair and' enlightened criticism of Hylo-idealism, at
page 2163 of T/ie Open Court, March 20. Surely, to begin with,
the terms Ego and Self, or I, are identical, and not as stated by
my critic, only similar. The term Soul is etymologically one with
Life (Leib), and can only be a function of the vital organism, not
a separate substance or entity. In fact, if we define Life, as we
must do now-a-days, and for ninety years past, on the principle of
general or structural anatomy (Somatology), as the sum of the or-
.ganic (corporeal) functions, and Death as their extinction, the whole
question drops by elimination of the whole imposing (in all senses
of the ambiguous term) "spiritual imposture"—using the latter
word in no invidious sense, but only as synonym for pre- and anti-
scientific illusion and delusion. And if God be a spirit— a word
which only means breath—that immemorial spectre vanishes as
only the Archimagus of provisional spiritualism (Animism). Ma-
terialism, or Somatism, upon which all true science rests, is clearly
hylo-zoic, and therefore Atheos, as independent of any immate-
rial principles or Anima Mundi to perform offices Matter performs
by its own J'is Insita. Monism seems thus, on the first princi-
ciples of logic, an Entelechy or assured demonstration, two ef-
ficient motives or (y«(7.r/-causes being inadmissible, when one is
sufficient. Miss Constance Naden's sentence, quoted in the cri.
tique, that Self, in hylo-ideal phraseology, is co-extensive with the
Cosmos—seems a root-idea quite incontrovertible. Objection is
also taken to my basal argument "that the human mind cannot
transcend its own percepts and concepts (consciousness), which con-
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stitute its entire universe." But surely my position here is quite
self-evident. Quod siij>ia, rv/ e.xlrii uos, nihil ad nos, i. e., non-
existent for us, is, if ever there was one, a simple and indisputable
axiom. It seems entirely to traverse my candid and able critic's
assertion "that in our own self we find conceptions [or ideals]
which constantly compel man to think higher than himself. For,
how can that be, if these conceptions and ideals are his very own ?
As my critic himself allows in the three words I have italicized in
the preceding sentence. Surely out of -S'c'^-consciousness all
is blank nihility. Indeed, there is an ambiguity in my critic's own
expression of belief in the correctness of Dr. Lewins's meaning,
while insisting, at the sarne time, on its being "misleading."
My reviewer quote?, with approval, a passage from the pamphlet,
" Hylo-Idealism, or Autocentricism," by H. L. C, to the effect
"that neither Matter nor Idea has the slightest preference over the
other." But that is a metaphysical compromise which I disclaim,
and which I may mention, was ultimately disclaimed by H. L. C.
himself, prior to his lamentable premature death by suicide, as the
consequence of over-strained brain and nerves while pursuing his
undergraduate studies at Cambridge. My position is that Matter
or Body is all in all, and that mind, idea, soul or spirit— i. e. Anim-
ism in every form— is only material or bodily eject, project, or ex-
hibit. " In the beginning" was not exactly Die That, as Goethe
makes Faust propound when translating the Neo-Platonic Fourth
Gospel, but Das Ding. And yet this "thing" only manifests
itself to us as a " Think.
"
In conclusion, I may remark, as elsewhere I have done, that
Professor Max Miiller, even on philological, which are less con-
clusive than anatomical data, is compelled to bear witness, in his
recent Science of Thought, that I have quite made out my conten-
tion that " thing" to us can be only "think." And on that con-
tention hangs the whole gist of my syntax. On that postulate I
base the whole truth or falsehood of Hylo-Idealism, which combines
Neo-Protagorism, the Lutheran doctrine of Private [individual]
Judgment, and the right of personal conscience, with the Kantian
negation of " Thing in itself." Religion (Divine worship), thus
expires, its substitute being Hygiene, defined not as mere sanitary
science, but, as Dr. Parkes in his manual of that ullimus partus
tcmporis has it, supreme culture of body, including brain—a sub-
stitution which at once transforms as by the Palingenesia fabled
of the Christian pseudo-revelation, the thought, conduct and destiny
of past and present derelict humanity. R. Lewins, M. D.
London, April 1890.
nly possible data o£ philosophy
The result of his philosophy is summed up in these words :
'The
and infinite /f:
BOOK REVIE\/VS.
The Way Out of Agnosticism ; or, the Philosophy of Free
Religion. By Francis Ellingwood Abbot, Ph. D. Boston :
Little, Brown, & Co.
This little volume of seventy-five pages contains Dr. Abbot's
philosophy in a more popular form than his larger work. Scientific
Theism. It is a collection of essays based on notes of forty-one
lectures delivered in 1888 in the " Advanced Course, Philosophy
13," at Harvard University. Agnosticism is characterized in the
preface as that philo ophical opinion according to which "no
theory of the universe is possible" and the most vital questions,
such as "whether the phenomenal universe is the product of in-
telligence or unintelligence .... whether conscious existence
ceases at death or continues beyond the grave, are necessarily and
absolutely unanswerable." Dr. Abbot fully recognizes the weak-
ness of this position, which has become the philosophy of the age,
and shows a way out of it by proposing a philosophy of free re-
ligion, such as he conceives to be the onlv possible one.
The basis on which Dr. Abbot takes his stand are the facts of
experience, critically sifted by science. He says :
" The universal results of the special sciences, including the method
known as at once infinite machine, infinite organism,
mechanical in its apparent form and action, organic in
its essential constitution, and personal in its innermost being : it is the eternally
self-evolving and self-involving unity of the Absolute Real and the Absolute
Ideal in God."
We must call the reader's attention to the fact that Dr. Ab-
bot uses the words organic and personal not in their precise scien-
tific meaning. The Universe is maintained to be personal, because
it makes morality passible : it is the objective ground and founda-
tion of moral action, or, as Dr. Abbot says, it is "moral." The
Universe being moral. Dr. Abbot calls it an infinite person. We
have in a former number * stated our dissent from this presentation,
and can accordingly be brief here. We use the words " organism
and person " in their usual and more limited sense, and must ac-
cordingly refrain from calling the Universe an organism or a per-
son. But granting the use of the word person in the sense of
affording an objective ground for our moral ideal, there would be
no objection to Dr. Abbot's conclusion.
To present, with brevity, the evolution of thought in great out-
lines. Dr. Abbot characterizes the three great phases of philosophy,
as (i) the Greek, (2) the German, and (3) the American. General-
izations of this kind are often useful, but easily lead the student
astray who is not sufficiently familiar with the particulars. We
believe that Dr. Abbot would better have characterized the differ-
ent views by their respective representatives, viz., by Aristotle and
by Kant. Kant being the leader of German philosophy, Kantian
philosophy is a special phase of, but can by no means be consid-
ered as the German theory.
Dr. Abbot says :
" In this German theory of Universals lies the deep, secret, and generally
unsuspected source of all modern Agnosticism, a result which was uncriti-
cally accepted, ready-made, by Spencer and Huxley from Hamilton and Man-
sel, borrowed by Hamilton and Mansel from Kant and the post-Kantian Ideal-
ists, and originally developed by Kant out of Hume and other adherents of
Scholastic Nominalism."
Kant's agnosticism (viz., the idea that things in themselves
are unknowable) was, after all, only a phase in his own develop-
ment, the traces of which were left in his chief work. The Critique
of Pure Reason. The Critique of Pure Reason stands as a land-
mark in the evolution of philosophic thought, and, like mountain-
ranges, the great landmarks of nature, this book owes its existence
to a revolution that threw up the differeiit strata of a long course
of development, and sometimes left the most recent thought, indi-
cating a new era, standing beside the most reverent, yet antiquated
ideas which Kant's genius had in vain endeavored to modernize.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is by no means a work that is of
one harmonious cast. It shows (as Windelband explained in an
article on the subject*) at least four phases in his conception of
noumena, some of which are radically contradictory to one
another. It is fortunate that the old and agnostic Kant did not
wipe out of later editions those passages which let us recognize the
younger and positive Kant.
However different Dr. Abbot's method and the sphere of his
activity are from ours, we recognize in his works the same goal
and the same ideal. We cannot agree with his terminology, nor can
we always consider his manner of systematizing thought a success.
The repetition of his three stages, the machine, the organism, the
person, appears to our conception artificial. Nevertheless we read
the book with pleasure and satisfaction, and believe that it will fulfil
its mission. The spirit of Dr. Abbot's philosophy is character-
ized in the concluding sentence :
* Pages 2050-51.
t Philosophische Monatshefte.
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"Said Ralph Waldo Emerson, America's greatest prophet; 'There is a
statement of religion possible which makes all scepticism absurd.' Is there
not such a statement lying latent and implicit in the Philosophy of Free
All Open Letter to the Hon. Edivard M. Paxson, the Chief Jus-
tice of Pennsylvania, is the title of a little pamphlet by Mr.
Richard B. Westbrook, of the Philadelphia bar, wherein two as-
sertions of the Chief Justice before the Law School of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania in October last—namely, (i) that the law of
Sinai was " the first of which we have knowledge, " and (2) that
Moses was the greatest statesman and lawgiver the world has ever
produced "—are severely animadverted upon. Dr. Westbrook has
written a learned letter, and presented the facts of his argument
in a formidable shape.
We have received the second number of the new Russian
philosophical quarterly Vcprosy filosLifii i psichologiiii (Questions of
Philosophy and Psychology), published by the Psychological So-
ciety of Moscow, and edited by the well-known Moscow savant,
Prof. Dr. N. Grote. In the prefatory remarks to the first volume
of this periodical. Professor Grote declared that it was the inten-
tion of the new quarterly to respond to an actual social need in
Russian life, and not merely to the cultured wants of a few philo-
sophically-inclined individuals. Russian philosophy, and conse-
quently the Russian conception of life and ethics, has been until
very recently the ideal embodiment of confusion and inconsis-
tency, never with an object of its own in view, but constantly and
servilely taking to itself the newest tendencies of occidental
thought. But within the last ten years there has been a notable
resuscitation of Russian original research, which has taken a dis-
tinctly national turn ; new life has appeared in the universities ;
authors like Solovieff, Tchitcherine, Strahoft, and Kozlof have
arisen ; a psychological society was founded in 1885, by Professor
Troitsky, in Moscow ; and finally the movement has exhibited an
ethico-social aspect in the renowned works of Count Leo Tolstoi.
To make the new review the e.xpoaent of this new tendency, is the
intention of its founders. It will eschew the preponderantly
special character that so many magazines of its kind affect, and
its pages will be open to the expression of every opinion. The
contents of the present number are as follows : " The Relations
of Voltaire to Rousseau," by I. L. Radlow ; " The Relations of
Philosophy to Science," by H. A. Ivanzow ; "Ethical Problems
in Contemporaneous Philosophy," by L. M. Lopatine ; "Con-
cerning the Question of Free-Will," by H. A. Zverev ; " What is
Metaphysics," by Prof, ferote ; " Psychophysical and Mechanical
Theories," by H. I. Tchitchine ; "Historical," by H. H.
Ovcianniko-Kulikowsky ; Reports, Reviews, Notes, etc.
The following are the chief contents of No. 2, of Vol. Ill, of
the American Journal of Psychology (January Quarter) ; " The In-
sanity of Doubt," by Philip Coombs Knapp ; "The Effect of
Fatigue on Voluntary Muscular Contractions," by Warren P. Lom-
bard ; " Studies from the Laboratory of Experimental Psychology
of the University of Wisconsin," by Joseph Jastrow ; "Children's
Lies"; " A Sketch of the History of Reflex Action." The first
results of the experimental work of the psychological laboratory of
the University of Wisconsin, under the direction of Prof. J. Jas-
trow, are here published ; they bear principally upon the establish-
ment and verification of the psycho-physic law. Dr. Lombards
researches on Voluntary Muscular Contractions are suggestive,
and Mr. Knapp 's article on the Insanity of Doubt is a fair resume
of his subject. The department of " psychological literature " is
especially rich and well worth the subscription to this quarterly.
(Editor, G. Stanley Hall, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.)
Neuroses Due to Eye-Strain." Dr. Gould's practical conclusions
are: (i) In headache rtfeiyj- suspect eye-strain, and especially in
women in the years between puberty and middle age (2) In func-
tional gastric derangements, not quickly to be explained otherwise,
suspect eye-strain, and especially if headache coexist (3) In other
functional derangements such as chorea, nervous heart, extreme
irritability of temper, hysteria, etc., that do not yield to treatment,
or that are not idiopathically or otherwise explainable, exhaust the
possibility of a reflex neurosis from eye-strain or other peripheral
irritation. (4) Have the refraction estimated, under a mydriatic,
and the coordination of the external ocular muscles proved, by a
scientific authority, in the case of every child, before or by the age of
pubertv.
THE EIGHT-HOUR MOVEMENT.
The eight-hour movement has in view the procuring o€ greater
leisure to workingmen, so that they can devote more time to in-
tellectual culture and self-education. We are in full sympathy
with this endeavor and we recognize the right of laborers to do all
they can to improve their condition and to fight for their ends by
the help of all the legal means that our constitution and laws afford
It is to be hoped that the scheme will, at least to some extent, prove
successful, and we should count it a great step forward if the em-
ployees of the government were to be engaged throughout the
United States on the eight-hour plan.
The eight-hour movement involves, however, ,many problems
concerning which it is almost impossible to foretell how they will
or can be solved. Will our capital be able to bear the loss of a
reduction in work without a reduction of wages ? Moreover, there
are workingmen who do not work by time, but by the piece. Fur-
ther, there are farmers, teachers, clergymen, editors, agents,
cabmen, railway-men, servants, and the like : how will they be
benefitted by the movement unless their salaries rise in the same
proportion ? And if thus a general increase of wages in all pro-
fessions be effected, would not necessarily everything become more
expensive in the same ratio ? Our gain, in that case, would be in
statistical figures only, but not in reality ; on the contrary we
would lose in an inverse ratio, since we would become that much
weaker in competing in the world-market with foreign nations.
Without considering all these difficulties we see a great danger
to the independent man of little means, the small employer, ai:d
to him who is about to start a business of his own. Is not the
preservation of this middle class universally considered as of great
concern in republican states ? and will not the consequences of the
eight-hour movement fall most heavily upon them ? It is scarcely
to be doubted that to many of them it will be fatal. Let us hope,
however, the best for the future. We trust that the leaders of
the movement will consider the problem from all sides, p. c.
Dr. George M. Gould has sent us copies of two pamphlets :
' Clinical Illustrations of Reflex Ocular Neuroses " ; and " Reflex
NOTES.
In a pleasant article "A Help to Moral Life" in the last
Ethical Record Mr. W. M. Salter, the leader of the Ethical Culture
Society of Chicago, proposes that a collection be made of the
ethically inspired passages of the literature of the world, which
shall " serve in the midst of our busy lives to remind us of higher
things, to freshen our aspirations and nerve our will." Such an
ethical anthology should be drawn from all the sacred and profane
writers. M. Aurelius, Plato, the Bible, Emerson, Newman, and
many others are suggested. But this work is to be the out-
come of the reading and experiences of many individuals, and all
accordingly are requested to send such appropriate passages and
selections as they come across, to Mr. W. M. Salter, of No. 516
North Avenue, Chicago, who probably may undertake their pub-
lication.
